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CASE COMMENT
PRESERVING LEGAL AVENUES FOR CLIMATE JUSTICE IN
FLORIDA POST-AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011)
Allison Fischman∗
In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP),1 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that “the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it
authorizes displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of
carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants,”2
foreclosing the use of federal common law rights of action in climate
change litigation. The Court left unanswered the question of whether the
Clean Air Act also displaces state common law tort actions,3 suggesting
that state-based claims such as public nuisance could play some part in
future climate change litigation. The opinion, however, conveys the
Court’s preference to confine climate change litigation to agency- and
regulatory-focused actions, as opposed to common law tort actions.4
After briefly summarizing the case, this Comment considers the
implications of that preference with regard to the “climate
vulnerable”—populations that are disproportionately impacted by the
effects of climate change—with a focus on Florida.
In 2004, two groups of plaintiffs—one group consisting of eight
states5 and New York City, and the other consisting of three nonprofit
land trusts6—filed separate complaints in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York against five major electric power
companies, which the plaintiffs alleged were “the five largest emitters
∗ J.D. anticipated 2012, University of Florida Levin College of Law; M.A. 2009,
University of Florida; B.A. 2007, University of Florida. I am grateful to Professor Dawn
Jourdan, Kathryn Kimball, and Paul Pakidis for their advice and encouragement, and to Bill
Eubanks for our conversation that inspired this Comment. Thanks also to the Environmental and
Land Use Law Program faculty for their dedication to students like me.
1. 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
2. Id. at 2537.
3. Id. at 2540.
4. Id. at 2539–40; see also Hari M. Osofsky, AEP v. Connecticut’s Implications for the
Future of Climate Change Litigation, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 101, 103 (2011),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/osofsky.html.
5. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2533–34. The eight states were California,
Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id. at 2533
n.3. New Jersey and Wisconsin declined to participate in the appeal. Id. (citing Brief for
Respondents Connecticut et al. at 3, Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 10-174), 2011
WL 915093, at *3).
6. The trusts were Open Space Institute, Inc., Open Space Conservancy, Inc., and
Audubon Society of New Hampshire. Id. at 2534 n.4.
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of carbon dioxide in the United States.”7 Those companies were four
private corporations and the Tennessee Valley Authority, “a federally
owned corporation that operates fossil-fuel fired power plants in several
states.”8 Collectively, the defendants’ emissions constituted “25 percent
of emissions from the domestic electric power sector, 10 percent of
emissions from all domestic human activities, and 2.5 percent of all
anthropogenic emissions worldwide.”9
The plaintiffs argued that the defendants violated the federal
common law of interstate nuisance or, in the alternative, state tort law,
because the defendants’ carbon dioxide emissions contributed to global
warming and thus created a “substantial and unreasonable interference
with public rights.”10 The states and New York City pointed to the risk
that climate change imposed on public lands, infrastructure, and health,
while the trusts alleged that climate change would irreparably harm
fauna and rare species of flora on trust-owned and operated
conservation lands. Both groups sought an injunction against the
defendants that would require each defendant “to cap its carbon dioxide
emissions and then reduce them by a specified percentage each year for
at least a decade.”11
The district court dismissed the complaints as barred by the political
question doctrine.12 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed, finding that the suits presented justiciable issues and that the
plaintiffs had established Article III standing.13 On the merits, the
Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs had “stated a claim under the
federal common law of nuisance,”14 recognized by the Supreme Court
in a series of decisions including Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
(Milwaukee I),15 which affirmed that “States may maintain suits to abate
air and water pollution produced by other States or by out-of-state
industry.”16 The Second Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II),17 which held
that by adopting amendments to the Clean Water Act, “Congress had
7. Id. at 2534 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. Id. The four private companies were American Electric Power Company, Inc. and its
wholly-owned subsidiary Southern Company, as well as Xcel Energy Inc. and Cinergy
Corporation. Id. at 2534 n.5.
9. Id. at 2534 (citation omitted).
10. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
13. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 332, 349 (2d Cir. 2009).
14. Id. at 358, 371.
15. 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
16. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2534 (citing Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 93).
17. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
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displaced the federal common law right of action recognized in
Milwaukee I.”18 The legislation at issue in Milwaukee II constituted “an
all encompassing regulatory program, supervised by an expert
administrative agency, to deal comprehensively with interstate water
pollution. The legislation itself prohibited the discharge of pollutants
into the waters of the United States without a permit from a proper
permitting authority.”19 In contrast, at the time of the Second Circuit’s
decision in AEP, neither Congress nor EPA had yet promulgated any
statute or rule limiting greenhouse gas emissions.20 Thus, the Second
Circuit found no displacement of federal common law.21
An equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s
exercise of jurisdiction,22 finding that the plaintiffs had standing and
that the political question doctrine did not bar their claims.23 The Court
then addressed the merits of the plaintiffs’ federal common law
nuisance claim in three parts, ultimately reversing the Second Circuit’s
decision.
First, the Court considered whether the plaintiffs could state a
federal common law nuisance claim to abate out-of-state air pollution.24
Calling the issue “academic,” the Court found that “[a]ny such claim
would be displaced by the federal legislation authorizing EPA to
18. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2534.
19. Id. at 2534–35 (citing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 310–11).
20. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 379–81 (2d Cir. 2009). The
Supreme Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), that the Clean Air Act
requires EPA to set greenhouse gas emission standards. Id. at 534–35; Am. Elec. Power Co., 131
S. Ct. at 2532–33.
21. 582 F.3d at 387–88.
22. The Court’s decision on the merits, however, was 8–0; Justice Sonia Sotomayor
recused herself. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2531.
23. Id. at 2535. Four justices found that “at least some plaintiffs have Article III standing
under Massachusetts, which permitted a State to challenge EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions,” id. at 2535 (citing Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520–26), and dismissed the
petitioner–defendants’ argument that a “prudential” bar—distinct from the Article III bar—
should prevent the federal courts from exercising jurisdiction. Id. at 2535 & n.6 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Implicit in the Court’s determination that “no other threshold obstacle
bars review,” id. at 2535, is an indication that the political question doctrine presents no barrier.
Significantly, the Court did not consider ripeness as a jurisdictional or prudential issue, perhaps
because at the time of the decision, EPA was already “engaged in a § 7411 rulemaking to set
standards for greenhouse gas emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants,” with May 2012 as
the agreed-upon deadline. Id. at 2538 (citing Notice, Proposed Settlement Agreement, Clean Air
Act Citizen Suit, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,392 (Dec. 30, 2010)).
While the justiciability issues certainly merit debate—see, for example, Daniel A. Farber,
Standing on Hot Air: American Electric Power and the Bankruptcy of Standing Doctrine, 121
YALE L.J. ONLINE 121 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/farber.html, and James R.
May, AEP v. Connecticut and the Future of the Political Question Doctrine, 121 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 127 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/may.html—an in-depth discussion of
these issues is beyond the scope of this Comment.
24. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535–37.
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regulate carbon-dioxide emissions.”25 Second, the Court explained its
holding that “the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes
displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of carbondioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”26 The Court
found that the Clean Air Act satisfies “[t]he test for whether
congressional legislation excludes the declaration of federal common
law” by “‘speak[ing] directly to [the] question’ at issue”—limitations on
carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel-fired power plants.27 Finally,
the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that federal common law
cannot be displaced until EPA exercises its regulatory authority by
setting carbon emission standards.28
In addition to the federal common law claims, the plaintiffs also
stated common law claims under state nuisance laws. The Court held
that the availability of such claims would depend on the preemptive
effect of the Clean Air Act.29 Because the parties had not “briefed
preemption or otherwise addressed the availability of a claim under
state nuisance law,” the Court left the matter “open for consideration on
remand.”30 This final point—the potential availability of state common
law tort claims—represents a window of opportunity for climatevulnerable Floridians to combat climate injustice.
In their continuing work to develop a regulatory framework for
climate change, Congress and EPA doubtless serve fundamental roles in
shaping the future of climate change litigation; however, total reliance
on Congress and EPA to limit greenhouse gas emissions presents clear
drawbacks.31 Agency rulemaking poses bureaucratic difficulties, not the
least of which is the typically lengthy and rigid process required for
even informal rulemaking.32 President Barack Obama’s recent rejection

25. Id. at 2537.
26. Id.
27. Id. (final alteration in original) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S.
618, 625 (1978)).
28. Id. at 2538. The plaintiffs argued that unlike in Milwaukee II, which considered
legislation that put in place “a panoply of actual remedies” to abate water pollution produced by
other states or out-of-state industry, the existence of EPA authority, without more, has no effect
on the defendants’ emissions. Brief for Respondents Connecticut et al., supra note 5, at 49.
29. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540 (citing Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co.,
582 F.3d 309, 392 (2d Cir. 2009)).
30. Id.
31. The opinion does not suggest total reliance on Congress and EPA, but simply
emphasizes regulatory suits over common law ones. It is worthwhile, however, to imagine a
scenario in which the Court’s preference is the only option.
32. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1386 (describing the informal rulemaking process as “increasingly stiff and
formalized”).
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of EPA’s new air pollution rule provides an illustration.33 The rule
would have lowered the allowable level of ozone in ambient air,
requiring stricter enforcement of ozone emission controls nationwide.34
Perhaps bowing to political pressure,35 the President stated that he “did
not support asking state and local governments to begin implementing a
new standard” when EPA must reconsider the current standard in 2013
pursuant to the Clean Air Act.36
Consider a similar scenario for a proposed greenhouse gas rule.37
AEP requires potential plaintiffs either to wait until EPA has
promulgated a regulation and then challenge it in court or to participate
in the rulemaking process during the public notice-and-comment period;
they cannot use federal common law avenues to enjoin emissions.38
Even if a potential plaintiff participates in the rulemaking process and is
satisfied with the final rule, the President can still prevent it from
becoming law. Post-AEP, fewer avenues for relief are available to such
a plaintiff.
The Court’s decision has important environmental justice
implications. As Professor Maxine Burkett argues, “[T]he common law
nuisance claims rejected by the Court in AEP provide an important
mechanism for the climate vulnerable to achieve corrective justice.”39
Addressing Professor Burkett’s point requires a brief discussion of
climate justice and an examination of the makeup of the climate
vulnerable.
Climate justice (CJ) is part of the broader environmental justice
movement, which seeks to ensure the equitable distribution of
33. See Letter from Cass Sunstein, OIRA Adm’r, to Lisa Jackson, EPA Adm’r (Sept. 2,
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ozone_national_ambient_air_
quality_standards_letter.pdf; Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement
by the President on the Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Sept. 2, 2011),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/02/statement-president-ozonenational-ambient-air-quality-standards; see also John M. Broder, Obama Administration
Abandons Stricter Air-Quality Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011
/09/03/science/earth/03air.html.
34. Broder, supra note 33.
35. Representatives from major business groups and Republicans in Congress stood in
firm opposition to the rule. As one reporter noted, “Imposing the new rule before the 2012
election would have created political problems for the administration and for Democrats
nationwide seeking election in a brittle economy.” Id.
36. Press Release, supra note 33.
37. EPA has already promulgated several rules limiting greenhouse gas emissions. See
David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New
Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 17 n.3 (2012) (listing regulations). See
generally Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change at EPA, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2012) (describing
EPA’s progress to date in regulating greenhouse gases).
38. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011).
39. Maxine Burkett, Climate Justice and the Elusive Climate Tort, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE
115, 115 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/burkett.html.
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environmental harms and benefits across all populations.40 Sea-level
rise and other effects of climate change will disproportionately impact
certain geographic areas, including the Arctic, Africa, Asian and
African megadeltas, and small island nation-states.41 Populations in
these areas are among the world’s poorest.42
Because climate change is a global phenomenon, scholars often
discuss it in an international context, exploring how the actions
individual nations may take to manage emissions—including entering
into an international agreement—will affect other countries and global
levels of greenhouse gases.43 But climate change will also
disproportionately affect vulnerable populations within the United
States. For example, when Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans,
the city experienced high death tolls among its elderly, poor, and
disabled.44 Climate change has the potential to increase the frequency of
catastrophic storms like Hurricane Katrina.45 Further, human activity
40. See Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots
Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 775, 802–03 (1998). EPA has defined environmental justice as “the fair treatment and
meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with
respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws,
regulations, and policies.” OFFICE OF ENVTL. JUSTICE, EPA, PLAN EJ 2014, at 3 (2011), available
at http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/resources/policy/plan-ej-2014/plan-ej-2011-09.pdf
(quoting EPA, EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: INTERIM GUIDANCE ON CONSIDERING
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACTION 3 (2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/policy/considering-ej-in-rulemaking-guide07-2010.pdf).
41. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 9 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf.
42. See Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal
for a Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169, 176–77 (2008). Most of
these populations have contributed the least to global greenhouse gas emissions, an observation
Jody Freeman and Andrew Guzman have called “an especially cruel twist of fate.” Jody
Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1531,
1535 (2009) (citing Robert Mendelsohn et al., The Distributional Impact of Climate Change on
Rich and Poor Countries, 11 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 159, 173 (2006)). This phenomenon is true
domestically, as well. See Burkett, supra, at 187–88.
43. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J.
1565, 1611 (2008). But see Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation’s
Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 587–88 (2009) (arguing that efforts to
manage emissions should take place at multiple and smaller scales than the international level
and that a strong focus on international legal approaches can impede such multiscalar
approaches).
44. Sharona Hoffman, Preparing for Disaster: Protecting the Most Vulnerable in
Emergencies, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1491, 1494 (2009).
45. Kristen Halsnæs et al., Framing Issues, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION 128 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-chapter2.pdf.
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and development exacerbate the devastating effects of such events,46
and U.S. coasts are highly developed.47 Sea-level rise alone presents a
major threat to domestic populations—by one estimate, ocean waters
will submerge 9% of U.S. lands by the year 2100.48
Climate change has already acutely impacted some U.S.
populations, notably the Native Village of Kivalina, an Inupiat Eskimo
village situated at the tip of an Alaskan barrier reef. Kivalina depends
on arctic sea ice to protect it from storm surges; due to global warming,
the ice has become less prevalent and less effective in protecting against
coastal erosion. The village is now uninhabitable, and relocation costs
could reach between $95 and $400 million.49
With more than 1,200 miles of coastline,50 Florida is particularly
susceptible to sea-level rise. The Florida Keys will likely generate the
state’s first wave of “climate migrants”51—those forced to relocate due
to the effects of climate change. Residents north of Miami could face
displacement by the end of the twenty-first century.52 Climate change
introduces potentially vast economic and social costs to the state and its
residents. Aside from displacement costs and real estate losses due to
sea-level rise, climate change will force Florida to face decreases in
tourism revenue; increases in hurricane damages, injuries, and deaths;
rises in electricity costs; and priceless biodiversity and ecosystem loss.53
46. See Christine A. Klein, The New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and
Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155, 1175 (2007).
47. See KRISTEN M. CROSSETT ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
POPULATION TRENDS ALONG THE COASTAL UNITED STATES: 1980–2008, at 9 (2004), available at
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/programs/mb/pdfs/coastal_pop_trends_complete.pdf
(providing
population and housing estimates along the coast and noting increased sprawl along coastlines).
48. S. Neil Larsen, Sea Level Rise a Threat to U.S. Coastal Cities, PROJECT
GROUNDSWELL (Feb. 16, 2011), http://projectgroundswell.com/2011/02/16/sea-level-rise-athreat-to-u-s-coastal-cities (reporting the results of a University of Arizona study).
49. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal
2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-17490 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 2009).
50. Florida Geological Survey—Coastal Research Program, FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT.,
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/geology/programs/coastal/coastal.htm (last updated Sept. 6, 2011)
51. See Maxine Burkett, In Search of Refuge: Pacific Islands, Climate-Induced Migration,
and the Legal Frontier, ASIAPACIFIC ISSUES (East-West Ctr., Honolulu, Haw.), Jan. 2011, at 3,
available at http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/api098.pdf (defining and
discussing the terminology of climate migration).
52. Greg Allen, Florida Faces Drastic Change from Sea Level Rise, NPR, Dec. 11, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120498442 (stating that under a model
predicting a sea-level rise of two feet by 2060, “Florida stands to lose almost 10 percent of its
land area and the homes of 1.5 million people”); GARY T. MITCHUM, FLA. CLIMATE INST. & SE.
CLIMATE CONSORTIUM, SEA LEVEL CHANGES IN THE SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES: PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE i (2011), available at http://coaps.fsu.edu/~mhannion/201108mitchum_
sealevel.pdf (estimating thirty-two inches in sea-level rise in south Florida by 2100).
53. See ELIZABETH A. STANTON & FRANK ACKERMAN, FLORIDA AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
THE COSTS OF INACTION iii (2007), available at http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/Florida_lr.pdf.
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Florida may not have to face the complex and difficult ethical issues
involved with relocating indigenous Inupiat in Kivalina,54 but CJ issues
will nonetheless multiply as a disproportionate amount of climate
change-induced harms and costs will likely fall on the state’s poor, ofcolor, elderly, and disabled residents. Florida’s average annual
temperature by 2100 could climb nearly ten degrees higher than the
average temperature in 2000,55 causing heat stress—“a public health
nightmare for the poor and of-color.”56 These groups will also bear a
heavier burden for increases in costs of goods and services and for
“employment restructuring within and across industries” that will come
with climate change.57 The lack of insurance only exacerbates the
problem.58
Florida’s future raises the question of what legal avenues exist to
redress climate change-induced harms suffered by the state’s most
vulnerable populations. The Supreme Court endorsed the regulatory
litigation pathway in AEP: petition for, or participate in, the rulemaking
process to set emissions limits, and file a citizen suit if the state or EPA
fails to enforce those limits.59 As discussed above,60 this approach has
definite drawbacks. For instance, the regulatory scheme fails to provide
any significant assistance to the climate vulnerable.61 Perhaps most
fundamentally, although regulatory suits may “help to lessen the
impacts of climate change, they provide limited opportunities for
victims to obtain redress.”62 If the role of the Legislative and Executive
Branches is to prevent future harms caused by the largest carbon
emitters, the role of the courts must be to “provide recourse to those
who have been wronged” by climate harms.63 Protecting the rights of
vulnerable populations from infringement by the Legislative and
Executive Branches is a core purpose of the Judiciary.64 No court has
yet addressed the merits of a state common law public nuisance action
54. Florida could, however, face similar issues with respect to its two federally recognized
tribal entities—the Miccosukee Tribe and the Seminole Tribe. Notice, Indian Entities
Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs,
75 Fed. Reg. 60,810, 60,811–12 (Oct. 1, 2010).
55. STANTON & ACKERMAN, supra note 53, at 8 tbl.4.
56. Burkett, supra note 42, at 178 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Climate Scientists David
Battisti et al. in Support of Petitioners at 14, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No.
05-1120), 2006 WL 2563377, at *14).
57. Id. at 180–81.
58. Id.
59. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2011).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 31–38.
61. Osofsky, supra note 4, at 106.
62. Id.
63. Burkett, supra note 39, at 118.
64. See Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One “Best”
Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995).
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for climate change-induced harms.65 By preserving state common law
tort actions for climate change harms, Florida courts66 have an
opportunity to provide a “means to achieve compensation for the loss of
[victims’] property and to facilitate their relocation.”67
Of course, such “social policy tort” lawsuits face many hurdles.68 In
addition to standing, justiciability, and causation difficulties, plaintiffs
and courts face complex issues concerning selection and conduct of
defendants, issue preclusion, measure of damages, assumption of risk,
insurance coverage,69 venue, and discovery, among many other
intricacies.70 But these threshold issues are not insurmountable. Hawaii
and Illinois state courts, for example, have adopted interpretations of the
special injury rule that could allow plaintiffs in climate change public
nuisance lawsuits like AEP to achieve standing without proof of
physical injury.71
Even if Florida courts refuse to consider the merits of such a claim
or rule in favor of the defense, climate tort litigation could encourage
the enactment of emissions regulations that more effectively address CJ
concerns.72 Apart from litigation, other legal tools may exist to help the
climate vulnerable. For instance, CJ advocates could lobby the state
legislature to enact progressive climate change-related regulations, such

65. Markell & Ruhl, supra note 37, at 22.
66. This includes federal courts in diversity actions.
67. Burkett, supra note 39, at 117.
68. See James W. Shelson, The Misuse of Public Nuisance Law to Address Climate
Change, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 195, 195 (2011). But see David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a NotSo-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (2003)
(arguing that public nuisance climate torts “might prove to be legally viable”).
69. The Supreme Court of Virginia recently held that Steadfast Insurance Company had
no duty to defend AES Corporation, a defendant in the Kivalina litigation. AES Corp. v.
Steadfast Ins. Co., No. 100764, 2011 WL 4139736, at *6 (Va. Sept. 16, 2011). Even if
corporations cannot use insurance dollars to cover litigation expenses, such defendants likely
still have far greater resources than potential climate-vulnerable plaintiffs.
70. Michael B. Gerrard, What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, 121
YALE L.J. ONLINE 135, 136–41 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/gerrard.html; see
also Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293,
294–306 (2005). A court might also bar such a suit under the Dormant Commerce Clause. See
Tracy Hester, A New Front Blowing In: State Law and the Future of Climate Change Public
Nuisance Suits, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 32) (on file with
author).
71. See James R. Drabick, Note, “Private” Public Nuisance and Climate Change:
Working Within, and Around, the Special Injury Rule, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 503, 511
(2005).
72. Randall S. Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice Movement: The Right
Thing and the Right Time, 85 WASH. L. REV. 197, 244 (2010) (“Public nuisance litigation is a
useful mechanism to spur ‘institutionalized’ relief in the form of a federal statutory or treatybased remedy in the near future for the victims of climate change impacts.”).
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as incentivizing emissions reductions.73 Another possibility may be to
require fossil fuel-fired power plants to conduct human rights impact
assessments as a prerequisite to obtaining a necessary permit.74 These
options, however, fail to provide CJ claimants with an opportunity “to
confront major emitters and gain redress for their particular—and
disproportionate—injuries.”75
This Comment argues that state common law tort actions such as
public nuisance represent an important pathway for redressing climate
change harms and avoiding climate injustice in Florida. A strong
argument exists that the social benefits of preserving state law climate
tort claims outweigh the difficulties associated with allowing them, but
only time will tell what limitations courts will place on these claims.
More broadly, AEP brings to the forefront normative questions about
the role of the courts in addressing climate change impacts. Do the
vulnerable, or any affected individuals, have a right to redress climate
change impacts or a right to seek damages from the largest emitters?
And how should plaintiffs and courts identify defendants—is “2.5
percent of all anthropogenic emissions worldwide,”76 as in AEP, an
appropriate threshold to establish responsibility? As judges struggle to
answer these questions in future cases, they should consider that
common law tort claims may more satisfactorily address injuries to the
climate vulnerable as compared to regulatory lawsuits or other
remedies.

73. Professor Burkett has argued for a domestic Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
modeled on the Kyoto Protocol CDM. Such a mechanism would “introduce an infrastructure
that provides incentives for economically depressed and of-color communities to become
venues for emissions abatement” and include a fund for climate change adaptation. Burkett,
supra note 42, at 170–71. Importantly, the Clean Air Act could preempt a state-level domestic
CDM.
74. See generally Tarek F. Maassarani et al., Extracting Corporate Responsibility:
Towards a Human Rights Impact Assessment, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 135 (2007) (presenting a
model for a human rights impact assessment). Again, such an action may risk running afoul of
the Clean Air Act.
75. Burkett, supra note 39, at 116.
76. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2011).
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